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The ‘Reasonableness’ of Unreasonable 




The jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) in prompt release cases seems to have been clarified through a series of 
relevant precedents. Methods and criteria such as the reasonableness test for as-
sessing the relevant factors related to a bond for prompt release may be said to 
have been standardised. It serves to balance the interests of the coastal States 
and the flag States, and it has its own merits and purposes, as is indicated in Ar-
ticles 73 and 292 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention). However, the procedures, which are limited in nature and purpose, 
are not suitable for dealing with the merits of cases of illegal, unreported, and un-
regulated (IUU) fishing, as a whole. The States using these procedures on prompt 
release should be prudent enough to utilize them for their original purpose.
I. Introduction
A total of nine cases at the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS) have been concerned with the prompt release of de-
tained vessels and the bond to be paid by the vessel owners1. Since the 
establishment of the ITLOS, these cases have been an overwhelmingly 
important part of the tribunal’s jurisprudence2. However, it cannot be 
said that the case law of the ITLOS is clear enough for the concerned 
States and practitioners of international law to rely on the predictabil-
ity of the Tribunal3. In other words, the criteria that the Tribunal uses 
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in assessing the ‘reasonableness’ of the bond or security posed by the 
detaining State still seem to be in the process of development as part of 
jurisprudence4. 
In such cases, some cardinal provisions under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) are to be men-
tioned before an account is made5. Article 73 of the LOS Convention 
provides as follows: 
Article 73
Enforcement of Laws and regulations of the coastal State
1.  The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, 
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest 
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with 
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2.  Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the post-
ing of reasonable bond or other security.
3.  Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulation in 
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence 
of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form 
of corporal punishment.
4.  In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall 
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action 
taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed. 
Article 292 of the LOS Convention, below, should also be fully re-
ferred to.
Article 292
Prompt release of vessels and crews
1.  Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the 
flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has 
not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release 
of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other fi-
nancial security, the question of release from detention may be submitted 
to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agree-
ment within 10 days from the time of detention, to a court or tribunal 
accepted by the detaining State under Article 287 or to the International 
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree.
2.  The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of the flag 
State of the vessel.
3.  The court of tribunal shall deal without delay with the application for re-
lease and shall deal only with the question of release, without prejudice to 
the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the 
vessel, its owner or its crew. The authorities of the detaining State remain 
competent to release the vessel or its crew at any time.
4.  Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security determined by 
the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State shall comply 
promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning the release 
of the vessel or its crew.
The above two cardinal provisions of the LOS Convention with re-
spect to prompt release cases have been analyzed by means of practical 
cases. Further, their practical meanings have been clarified by each 
judgment of the relevant cases at ITLOS. The original purpose behind 
the enshrinement of Article 292 into Part XV of the LOS Convention 
is to allow the intervention of the flag state of the detained vessel into 
the criminal procedures of the coastal state6. In other words, it is an 
important intersection of the law of the sea with the domestic laws and 
regulations of the coastal state. Therefore, it is noteworthy in that the 
mechanism and institution of prompt release is a special procedure to 
strike a balance between the legal interest of the coastal state, which is 
secured by the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, and that of the flag 
state, which is aimed at its freedom of navigation. 
The author of this paper has already mentioned that the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the ITLOS under the LOS Convention cur-
rently plays an important role, particularly in the regulation of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing7 and in striking a balance 
between the coastal States’ and the flag States’ rights in the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ)8. With regard to the first point, IUU fishing in the 
management area of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) has been the principal concern for 
the state parties of this Convention. Maritime enforcement action in 
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the CCAMLR area has been taken by Australia and France in the EEZs 
surrounding their Antarctic island territories9. The growing tendency of 
IUU fishing in the EEZs of these countries has triggered more effective 
and rigorous enforcement practices by the concerned states in terms of 
implementing measures under the domestic laws of the coastal states10. 
Thus, the cases concerning the prompt release of the detained vessels 
by coastal states such as Australia and France have been presented be-
fore ITLOS; these cases include the Volga, Camouco, Monte Confurco, 
and Grand Prince cases. In these cases, the main issues discussed by 
ITLOS were the ‘reasonableness’ of the bond and the security imposed 
by the concerned coastal states, which are likely to interpret and apply 
the provisions mentioned above in their own favour in order to justify 
their measures against the recently worsening practices of IUU fishing.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is, first, to identify the major 
issues of the ITLOS jurisprudence, particularly in the prompt release 
cases, the judgments for which are adequate for deducing some general 
criteria for the concept of ‘reasonableness’, and second, to draw some 
conclusions on the current tendency in the law of the sea concerning 
prompt release and IUU fishery within the framework of the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the LOS Convention. Accordingly, it is neces-
sary to briefly overview the essential points of each case on prompt re-
lease. 
II. Some issues regarding the cases
Before considering the legal issues regarding the relationship 
between the prompt release of detained vessels and the enforcement 
of regulation by the coastal State, it is noteworthy that each case on 
prompt release at the ITLOS has its own particulars. This point should 
be discussed in detail.
Normally, with respect to cases of prompt release of a detained ves-
sel under the LOS Convention, the two parties may choose, from among 
many options, the forum that will determine the conditions of the re-
lease. However, the ITLOS will seize if a decision is not taken within 
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ten days of detention. Under Articles 292 and 73(2) of the LOS Conven-
tion, arrested vessels and their crew shall be promptly released upon 
the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. Thus, the condition 
of ‘reasonableness’ and the content of ‘security’ are the main points of 
consideration here.
1. The Saiga Cases: Numbers 1 and 211
In the Saiga Case (No. 1), an oil tanker, the Saiga, whose flag 
was of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, bunkered fishing vessels 
off the coast of Guinea and was arrested by Guinean Customs patrol 
boats. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines filed a case against Guinea, 
at the ITLOS, for the prompt release of the arrested vessel. According 
to Guinea, the bunkering had taken place in its contiguous zone and 
was an infringement of its customs legislation. The Saiga was arrested 
in Guinea’s EEZ following a hot pursuit12. These prompt release pro-
ceedings were the first case before the ITLOS, and the first trial of the 
prompt release procedures under the Convention.  
The Tribunal, by twelve votes to nine, held that the vessel be re-
leased on a bond of the amount of the gas oil taken from the vessel by 
Guinea and a further financial security of USD 400,00013. The judgment 
did not clarify the requirements concerning ‘a reasonable bond’ but only 
stated that the ‘criterion for reasonableness encompasses the amount, 
the nature and the form of the bond’14. 
Guinea’s objection that the application was inadmissible because no 
bond had been posted was not successful. As was pointed out by some 
of the judges who dissented15, it may be said that, since the applicant in 
this case had not indicated non-compliance by the detaining State with 
respect to prompt release and as, therefore, the prompt release could 
not have been justified, the question of the amount or terms of the bond 
should not have addressed16. The proceedings under Article 292 do not 
form a so-called preliminary or incidental case, but a discrete and defin-
itive one. Although the judgment ‘leaves a number of important issues 
unresolved’17, the Tribunal’s first judgment seems to have generally re-
ceived a favourable evaluation.
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The Saiga case (No. 2), in its first stage, dealt with the applicant’s 
request for indication of provisional measures by the Tribunal. The Tri-
bunal delivered a unanimous Order, prescribing provisional measures 
for the continued detention of the Saiga and its crew. In the merits 
phase, the Tribunal considered the illegality of the arrest and detention 
of the Saiga and its crew, determined the liability caused by Guinea, 
and awarded damages for part of the loss due to the aforementioned 
discharges of gas oil.
2. The Camouco Case18
In 2000, Panama filed an application against France, at the Tribu-
nal, for the prompt release of the fishing vessel Camouco, whose flag 
was Panamanian, and its master, under Article 292 of the LOS Conven-
tion. The Camouco was arrested and detained by French authorities in 
1999 for allegedly unlawful fishing of the Patagonian toothfish and for 
the Camouco’s illegal presence in the EEZ off the Crozet Islands (French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories). The main issues of this case were, 
first, whether the vessel should be released or not, and, second, the 
amount of bond or guarantee. The judgment was in favour of the release 
of the vessel and its master upon Panama’s posting of a bank guarantee 
or other agreed-upon financial security.
The Tribunal largely followed the precedent of the Saiga Case19, 
but it also embarked on some new aspects of the matter. Under Article 
292 of the LOS Convention, for the majority of the Tribunal, neither the 
time requirement for the application nor the principle of exhaustion of 
local remedies could hinder the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
these proceedings, since the phase of prompt release is a separate pro-
cedure that only deals with the question of release under Article 292(3) 
of the LOS Convention20. 
In a sense, the most important issue was the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
bond. Even though the Tribunal affirmed the reasonableness test that 
the Saiga (No. 1) judgment had indicated in its reasoning, the majority 
opinion in the judgment of the Camouco case also took into consider-
ation factors such as the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties 
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imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the esti-
mated value of the detained vessel and cargo and the amount and form 
of the bond imposed by the detaining State21. The amount of the bond 
that the Tribunal fixed was eight million FF, which was 40% of the 
amount originally claimed by the detaining State, France22.
3. The Monte Confurco Case23
In 2000, Seychelles instituted proceedings against France at the IT-
LOS, for the prompt release of the Monte Confurco, a fishing vessel fly-
ing the flag of Seychelles, and its master, under Article 292 of the LOS 
Convention. The vessel was arrested by a French frigate in the EEZ off 
the Kerguelen Islands (French Southern and Antarctic Territories) for 
alleged illegal fishing and unannounced presence in the French EEZ.
The main issue, in this case as well, was the meaning of ‘reason-
ableness’ of the bond or guarantee that had been imposed by the French 
court24. The Tribunal noted that the balance of interests in Articles 73 
and 292 of the LOS Convention provided the guiding criterion for its as-
sessment of the reasonableness of the bond25. On the other hand, there 
was the coastal State’s interest to take the appropriate measures to 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it and on 
the other hand, the interest of the flag State to secure prompt release of 
its vessels and crew from detention. In order for the Tribunal to check 
whether the amount of the bond was excessive and unrelated to the 
gravity of the alleged offence, the judgment in this case followed the 
precedents of prompt release at the ITLOS, as in the Saiga and Camou-
co cases.26
Since the arguments developed by the two parties were far apart 
and since there was a lack of time and ability in seeking evidence in 
support of the allegations of either party, the Tribunal had to follow 
precedents in applying various factors to the present case27. After con-
sidering the gravity of the alleged offences and the range of penalties 
imposable under French law for the alleged offences, the value of the 
vessel detained and of the fish and fishing gear seized28, the Tribunal in 
its judgment held that the bond imposed by the French court was not 
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reasonable, and reduced the amount of the bond by a third and ordered 
that the form of the bond be changed from cash or certified cheque (which 
had been ordered by the French court) to a bank guarantee29. 
By the time the judgement was rendered in this case, the jurispru-
dence of the prompt release cases at the ITLOS seemed to have almost 
been consolidated, in terms of the ‘reasonableness’ test. Needless to 
say, the Tribunal is required to evaluate both sides of the arguments of 
both parties so that it can reach a conclusion, the objectivity of which 
is supported by the Tribunal’s evaluation of the circumstances, which 
it deems to be convincing enough to be ‘reasonable’. However, it may 
also be said that this ‘reasonableness’ depends on the circumstances 
on which each case is based30. Moreover, it has been made clear by the 
Tribunal that the ITLOS ‘is not an appellate forum against decisions of 
domestic courts’31.
4. The Grand Prince Case32
In 2001, Belize instituted proceedings against France at the ITLOS 
for the prompt release of the Grand Prince, flying the flag of Belize, 
and its master. The vessel was arrested in the French EEZ off the Ker-
guelen Island (in the French Southern and Antarctic Territories) for 
the alleged offences of illegal fishing and unannounced presence in the 
French EEZ. The French criminal court at Saint-Paul convicted the 
vessel, confiscated the vessel, equipment and fish cargo and fined the 
master two million FF. 
What is unusual about this case was the decision, by 12 votes to 
nine, that the application of Belize be dismissed because Belize had 
no standing (locus standi) to file it at the Tribunal. In regard to the 
documents produced by Belize, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the 
Grand Prince was a vessel registered with Belize at the time in ques-
tion33. In other words, in the view of the Tribunal, Belize did not dis-
charge its onus to prove that the vessel had been registered under its 
law at the time of the application to the ITLOS34. 
There should be some remarks with respect to the arguments that 
would have been concerned with the merits phase between the parties 
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at the Tribunal. Although the case itself has little meaning as a reliable 
precedent of prompt release, since it was dismissed, it is noteworthy 
that IUU fishing activities in the Southern Ocean have become a seri-
ous matter of concern in maritime and fishery States despite the fact 
that the regime of the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarc-
tic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)35 has been tackling this very 
issue intensively for the last decade. The present case should be consid-
ered in this context. The French attitude to IUU has been like this for 
the same reason.
The next case is the Chaisiri Reefer 2 case in 200136, where Panama 
filed proceedings against Yemen, at the ITLOS, for the prompt release 
of a detained vessel, although the parties afterwards resolved the dis-
pute and the vessel was released. Thus, the case was ordered to be 
discontinued and removed from the list of cases. Since the case was not 
dealt with at the Tribunal, there is no need for discussion on the issue 
of prompt release.
5. The Volga Case37
In 2002, the Russian Federation submitted an application to the 
ITLOS against Australia, under Article 292 of the LOS Convention, 
for the release of the Volga, a long-line fishing vessel flying the flag of 
the Russian Federation, and three crew members (who were Spanish). 
The vessel was arrested by Australian authorities beyond the limits of 
the EEZ off the Australian territory of Heard Island and the McDon-
ald Islands for alleged illegal (or IUU) fishing in the Australian EEZ38. 
The master and the crew of the Volga were detained under Australian 
law, and the three major persons aboard were charged with criminal 
offences. After the criminal procedures, the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia upheld the appeal of the three members and ordered their re-
lease under certain conditions39. 
The issue before the Tribunal, again, was the reasonableness of the 
bond and/or other security. Russia argued that the bond sought by Aus-
tralia was not reasonable since the conditions it imposed were against 
Article 73(2) of the LOS Convention. Australia maintained that the 
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bond was reasonable with regard to the circumstances of the particular 
case40. The Volga was allegedly engaged in IUU fishing in the area cov-
ered by CCAMLR, and the continuing IUU fishery in this area was, for 
Australia, a matter of international concern41. This point was central to 
the case even though this type of very essential and substantial issue 
may not be relevant in a prompt release case due to the limitation of 
the original framework of the mechanism enshrined in Articles 73 and 
292 of the LOS Convention. The Tribunal was called upon to complete 
the task of deciding whether the bond set was reasonable or not in light 
of Article 292.
The Tribunal followed the reasonableness test that the Camouco 
case had used42 when it assessed the relevant factors concerning the 
reasonableness of the bond or other financial securities. The Tribunal 
reiterated that the purpose of the procedure under Article 292 was to 
secure a prompt release of the vessel and its crew upon the posting of a 
reasonable bond, pending completion of the judicial procedures before 
the domestic courts of the detaining State43. The Tribunal sought a bal-
ance between the gravity of the alleged offences and the penalties that 
may have been imposed for them under Australian law. 
What is peculiar about the present case is that the Tribunal had 
to deal with the question of whether the additional conditions that 
Australia had imposed upon the release of the vessel were within the 
meaning of the terms of Article 292 or not. These conditions were that 
the vessel (should) carry a vessel monitoring system (VMS) and that 
the information details about the owner and the ultimate beneficial 
owner of the vessel be submitted to its authorities44. However, the Tri-
bunal ruled that since the term ‘bond or other security’ in Articles 73(2) 
and 292 of the LOS Convention should be interpreted as referring to a 
bond or security of a purely financial nature due to the lack of clear ex-
pression to this effect in any part of the LOS Convention, non-financial 
conditions such as those imposed by Australia, i.e., a ‘good behaviour 
bond’, could not be considered a bond or other financial security under 
the Articles mentioned above45. The Tribunal only accepted the amount 
that represented the full value of the vessel, fuel, lubricants and fish-
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ing equipment, and did not accept the non-financial conditions set down 
by Australia since they could not be considered to be components of the 
bond or other security. 
Australia sought the legality of the imposition of a ‘good behaviour 
bond’ to prevent future violation46. The Tribunal, however, did not con-
sider it to be a proper bond or security within the meaning of Article 
73(2) of the LOS Convention since it interpreted Article 73 as one that 
envisages enforcement measures in respect of the violation of a coastal 
State’s laws and regulations that is alleged to have been committed47. 
Therefore, in this case, it may be said that the procedures concerning 
prompt release are very narrowly set and framed, and that the Tribu-
nal interpreted the provisions concerning prompt release literally and 
did not allow any derogation by way of imposing additional conditions 
apart from the terms under the relevant Articles48. 
6. The Juno Trader Case49
In 2004, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines instituted proceedings 
against Guinea-Bissau, at the ITLOS, for the prompt release of the 
reefer vessel Juno Trader, which was flying the flag of Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. The vessel and its crew were allegedly detained 
by the Guinea-Bissau authorities for the violation of national fisheries 
laws in its EEZ. 
After finding that the application was well-founded and that the 
respondent should promptly release the vessel upon the posting of a 
reasonable bond, the Tribunal moved on to consider the factors de-
termining the reasonableness of a bond by relying on jurisprudence 
concerning prompt release cases at the ITLOS. First of all, it assessed 
the proportionality of the gravity of the alleged offences to the amount 
of the bond imposed or imposable. The main issue in this case was the 
amount of the bond on the basis of the value of the Juno Trader and the 
cargo, both of which had to be decided by the Tribunal due to the severe 
difference in the arguments of both parties.
The judgment rendered by the Tribunal was a unanimous decision 
on all points, which was extremely rare in the light of the jurisprudence 
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of the ITLOS, although some declarations and separate opinions of the 
judges were attached to the judgment. In other words, the substantial 
issue of this case was apparent and had almost no disagreement among 
the judges. The significance of this case, in terms of precedence, is the 
Tribunal’s statement that the obligation of prompt release ‘includes el-
ementary considerations of humanity and due process of law’ and that 
there must be a ‘concern for fairness’ in the process of fixing a reason-
able bond50. As is shown in the judgment of this case51, the assessment 
of the relevant factors concerning the prompt release of the vessel and 
its crew must be ‘an objective one, taking into account all information 
provided to the Tribunal by the parties’52. This point was also repeated 
by some judges in their opinion that a fair trial and due process must 
be guaranteed53. 
7. The Hoshinmaru Case54
In 2007, Japan instituted a case against the Russian Federation, 
under Article 292 of the LOS Convention, for the prompt release of the 
Hoshinmaru, which flew the flag of Japan, and its crew, both of which 
were detained by the Russian authorities for the alleged violation of na-
tional fisheries laws in its EEZ. 
Even though the Russian Federation objected to the admissibility 
of the case on the grounds that no bond had been set by the time of the 
filing of the application (though the bond was set a week later), the Tri-
bunal found it admissible since a Russian objection of this kind did not 
change the nature of the dispute, but narrowed the scope of the dispute 
in terms of the reasonableness test55. The time requirement to set a 
bond is not provided for in the LOS Convention, but both parties agreed 
that it should be set within a reasonable time. Here, again, the question 
is concerned with the reasonableness test under Article 292, i.e., that of 
the time required for setting a bond.
A more fundamental issue in this case was the reasonableness of 
the bond set by the Russian Federation. The Tribunal did not accept 
the argument made by the respondent that the penalty should be cal-
culated on the basis of the amount of the fish allegedly illegally taken, 
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the value of the vessel and the administrative expenses of conducting 
the investigation for the Russian authorities, and that these factors 
were set out and agreed upon with Japan in the Russian-Japanese 
Joint Commission on Fisheries. The Tribunal did not find it sufficient to 
establish the acquiescence of the Japanese representatives in the pro-
cess of the calculation of the bond56. Unlike the other cases of prompt 
release, this case did not entail a matter of IUU fishing activities, since 
the vessel and the crew had a licence57.
Moreover, taking into account jurisprudence58, the Tribunal found 
it not reasonable, in light of the circumstances of the present case, to 
set the bond on the basis of the maximum penalties, or to calculate the 
bond based on the confiscation of the vessel59. The Tribunal reduced 
the amount of the bond set by Russia by more than half, considering 
the proportion of the amount of the bond to the gravity of the alleged 
offences60, although it showed, to a certain degree, its understanding 
of the serious situation and the dangers of over-exploitation caused by 
IUU fishing in the area61. The judgment given was unanimous, though 
there were some declarations and a separate opinion. In other words, 
the legal question was not extremely complicated but was fairly clear. 
8. The Tomimaru Case62
In this case, as well, Japan instituted an application against the 
Russian Federation for the prompt release of the fishing vessel Tomi-
maru, which flew the flag of Japan. The vessel had been confiscated on 
the basis of the decision of the respondent’s local court. Moreover, the 
release of the master and crew was not at issue since they had been 
released before this decision. The main issue was the detention of the 
vessel and its crew by the Russian authorities for the alleged violation 
of national fisheries laws in its EEZ. 
However, the Tribunal unanimously found that the application was 
without object63. The Tribunal differentiated the two important ques-
tions: (1) whether confiscation may have an impact on the nationality 
of a vessel; and (2) whether confiscation renders an application for the 
prompt release of a vessel without object64. The Tribunal denied the 
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impact in the first question on the grounds that the balance of inter-
ests of the flag State and of the coastal State established in the LOS 
Convention must be maintained. In other words, ‘the confiscation of a 
vessel does not result per se in an automatic change of a flag or in its 
loss’65. As for the second question, the Tribunal answered positively and 
emphasised the importance of the prompt action that the flag State is 
responsible for under Article 292. According to the judgment, the Tribu-
nal could consider an application for prompt release while proceedings 
still were before the domestic courts of the detaining State66. 
Normally, confiscation incurs the transfer of title from the owner 
of the material in question to the detaining State. In the present case, 
since the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had rendered its fi-
nal decision, which brought an end to the procedure before the domestic 
courts, the Tribunal was rather obliged to refrain from considering the 
case, in accordance with Article 292(3) of the LOS Convention, which 
provides for not giving ‘prejudice to the merits of any case before the 
appropriate domestic forum against the vessel or its crew’67. Thus, the 
Tribunal found that the application was without object.
III. Considerations of the issues
As the Tribunal’s jurisprudence on prompt release demonstrates, 
the most important issue in this regard is the reasonableness test. The 
relevant factors that must be taken into account are now almost identi-
fiable thanks to the development of case-law at the Tribunal. As is sug-
gested, Article 73 of the LOS Convention appears to permit confiscation 
of the catch, the vessel and the equipment as punishment for violating 
coastal state laws and regulations. 
The only specific restriction imposed on penalties for violations of 
fisheries laws and regulations in the EEZ is that they may not include 
imprisonment (in the absence of agreement to the contrary by the states 
concerned) or any other form of corporal punishment68. No additional 
condition concerning imposing a bond is admitted by the Tribunal. 
Regarding this aspect, the Tribunal’s strict approach in applying the 
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relevant provisions of UNCLOS is comparatively consistent throughout 
the jurisprudence, with the result of fairly solid (almost unanimous) 
decisions, which have been favourable for the applicants and not for the 
respondents. 
However, it is also necessary to pay attention to the trend of many 
coastal States enacting legislation that empowers the coastguard or 
fishery protection agencies to board and inspect fishing vessels in the 
EEZ, and that these measures have been functioning mainly for a 
safeguard against IUU fishing, in the maritime areas of the Southern 
Ocean and in others areas, where IUU fishing has been considerably 
at issue among the States concerned69. Some States have great concern 
about IUU fishing and have tried to tighten their regulation measures, 
such that the posture and attitude to IUU fishing of these more tight-
ened measures will serve as a lesson or as a warning to others in the 
future.
Thus, these measures, including those of non-repetition of actions of 
the same kind, and severe penalties may incur a dispute concerning the 
prompt release of the detained vessels and their crew. In other words, 
in almost all the cases, there is inevitably a link between the substan-
tive issue and that of prompt release70. However, the jurisprudence has 
consistently turned a blind eye to this aspect within the framework of 
prompt release under the LOS Convention. This seems to have been so 
only in the name of ‘balancing the interests of the flag States and those 
of the coastal States’71. There is, however, much debate about the ques-
tion whether this slogan has been really kept at the Tribunal.
The next noteworthy point is that confiscation extinguishes the 
duty to release the vessel on bond, as was unanimously decided in the 
Tomimaru case. The Tribunal cautioned the flag State about undue de-
lay, by stating:
‘[C]onsidering the objective of Article 292 …, it is incumbent upon the 
flag State to act in a timely manner. This objective can only be achieved if 
the shipowner and the flag State action within reasonable time either to 
have recourse to the national judicial system of the detaining State or to ini-
tiate the prompt release procedure under Article 292’.72
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In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the precedent in which 
the Tribunal did not accept the argument for a requirement of the 
exhaustion of local remedies before an application for prompt release 
could be submitted. The judgments rendered have emphasised the 
avoidance of undue delay, denial of justice (due process of law), etc73. 
The issue of confiscation, in this context, contains a very compli-
cated and ambiguous problem that touches upon the relation between 
domestic law and international law74. At least within the framework of 
prompt release under the LOS Convention, the procedures concerning 
prompt release have a limited function with a limited purpose, so that 
both national law and international law will have no conflict, in terms 
of this framework, under the LOS Convention.
IV. Conclusions 
In sum, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
First, the jurisprudence on prompt release at the ITLOS seems to 
have been considerably developed and consolidated. Its procedures are 
solely for their own purposes and are independent of the merits of the 
case, under Articles 73 and 292 of the LOS Convention, whose pur-
pose is to strike a balance between the interests of the coastal and flag 
States. From the point of view of the coastal States, the proceedings 
at the Tribunal on prompt release will not meet their wishes, which 
tend to seek for harder measures to enforce their domestic legislation 
against IUU fishing. This may be understandable in the sense that the 
prompt release proceedings are not necessarily targeted at combating 
IUU fishery75, but at the just and humanitarian approach of the last re-
sort within the LOS Convention regime. 
The nature and purpose of the procedures on prompt release, there-
fore, have nothing to do with the legality or illegality of the matters at 
issue in each case, no matter how strong and deep the connections be-
tween IUU fishing and prompt release cases may be. In this sense, the 
mechanism for prompt release under the relevant provisions in the LOS 
Convention may have been misunderstood or misused, mainly in the 
123
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 107–128
cases involving IUU fishery issues. The LOS Convention is, needless to 
say, the typical result of a compromise between the coastal states and 
the flag states; this is also the case with the institution of prompt re-
lease in the LOS Convention. 
However, it should be noted that the original purpose and objective 
of the prompt release mechanism are not to protect the values that are 
referred to under Part V of the LOS Convention, such as the conserva-
tion of the living resources of the sea and the effective enforcement of 
national fisheries laws and regulations,76 or to provide scope for ITLOS 
to challenge the discretionary powers of the coastal states in imple-
menting measures concerning the enforcement of national laws and 
regulations on the management of marine living resources in the EEZ77.
The purpose of the procedure in Article 292 is to secure the prompt 
release of a vessel and its crew on the posting of a reasonable bond, 
pending the completion of the judicial procedures before the courts of 
the detaining state78. Thus, the Tribunal is called upon to decide solely 
if the bond set was reasonable according to Article 292 of the LOS 
Convention. Therefore, the Tribunal has clarified that non-financial 
conditions (such as a ‘good behaviour bond’) cannot be considered a 
‘bond or other financial security’ for the purpose of applying Article 292 
with respect to alleged violation of Article 73 (2) of the LOS Conven-
tion79. Thus, in this context, it should be considered that the ITLOS 
and, more specifically, the prompt release mechanism are ineffective 
at properly addressing the issue of regulating IUU fishing, and that 
the LOS Convention itself does not provide a suitable or appropriate 
institution or mechanism to cope with this issue. In other words, the 
disputes between the coastal states and the flag states arising from the 
issue of regulating IUU fishing may not be substantially resolved under 
the LOS Convention regime. A study of the cases on prompt release 
suggests that the limited use, if not the ineffectiveness, of the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the LOS Convention in regulating or 
managing global fishery activities has made a significant impact on the 
development of regional and sub-regional complementary institutions 
such as the CCAMLR regime80. 
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It may also be said that the reasonableness test concerning the as-
sessment of the relevant factors for setting a bond prevails in the un-
reasonable and ironic situations in which coastal States have had dif-
ficulties in enforcing their more effective domestic measures. 
Second, the Tribunal has cautioned both the coastal and flag States 
not to abuse the domestic procedures of confiscation and to file cases for 
prompt release on time, despite the risk that the conditions of the do-
mestic procedure conditions on the merits of a case on IUU fishery may 
have the effect of rendering the case at the ITLOS without object. Here 
we see the entangled but separated relationship between the domestic 
legal system and international legal order. 
Finally, although the jurisprudence on prompt release at the IT-
LOS is still under development, one thing has become certain and clear: 
the procedures have been functioning with the results, per se, that the 
Convention framework intended. In connection to this, the following 
comment was made by an imminent international lawyer, former Judge 
Shigeru Oda, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ):
‘It seems to [Judge Oda] that the whole structure of provisions for the 
prompt release of vessels and their crews under Article 292 in the Conven-
tion does not make any sense and is in fact unworkable. The relevant provi-
sion was drafted at UNCLOS III simply on the basis of wishful thinking, 
arising from a lack of understanding of the whole situation relating to the 
exercise of coastal jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone’81. 
It is of interest that the first half of this statement has turned out 
to be beside the point and flawed. Rather, now, the utility of the Tri-
bunal may be more highly valued. For Judge Oda and those who have 
been critical of the dispute settlement mechanism of the LOS Conven-
tion, the prompt release procedures may be the product of compromise 
between the coastal States and the flag States, i.e., the counterbalance 
of the ‘creeping jurisdiction’ of the coastal States that had been exceed-
ingly prevalent at the time of the conclusion of the LOS Convention. 
However, more importantly, if one takes a careful look at the bigger pic-
ture of world fishery, which has been endangered by IUU fishing, one 
125
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 107–128
will find it ironic that the reasonableness test in prompt release cases 
before the ITLOS does not ‘make any sense’ or is ‘unworkable’ in situa-
tions where repetitive IUU fishing has not been effectively suppressed. 
(1 December 2009)
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Grants of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The 
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